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Market Performance Implications of the
Transfer Price Rule
Stephen Martin* and Jan Vandekerckhove{
The ‘‘transfer price rule’’ (TPR) defines a vertical price squeeze as an input price, output price
combination set by a vertically-integrated firm monopoly producer of an essential input that
would not allow the firm’s downstream unit to earn at least a normal rate of return on
investment in the ‘‘as-if’’ case that it had to purchase the input at the price charged independent
firms. In its 2009 linkLine decision, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected the TPR for the purpose of
enforcing the anti-monopolization prohibition of Section 2 of the Sherman Act. In contrast, a
vertical price squeeze, defined by a TPR-like standard, is an abuse of a dominant position under
Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union. In this article, we model
the impact of the TPR on market performance. We find that the TPR increases consumer
surplus and net social welfare if all firms remain active in the downstream market. It sometimes
induces the upstream firm to refuse to supply the downstream firm, and in such cases, consumer
surplus and net social welfare are reduced. The impact of the TPR on market performance thus
depends on whether or not an upstream firm can refuse to supply downstream firms on terms
that would offer it at least a normal rate of return on investment.
JEL Classification: L12, L41, L44
1. Introduction
A pricing strategy open to a firm that operates in an imperfectly competitive downstream
market and simultaneously supplies its rivals in that market with an essential input over which
it exercises some market power is to set a high wholesale price for the input and a low final
good price for the output. The issue raised for antitrust and competition policy by such a price
squeeze is the impact of the potential exclusion of equally efficient horizontal competitors in the
downstream market on consumer surplus and net social welfare.
Vertical price squeezes were part of the youth and early adulthood of U.S. antitrust.1 They
are central to recent U.S. antitrust and European Union (EU) competition policy cases
involving monopolization and abuse of a dominant position. Many of these cases arise in
markets in which downstream firms supply internet access to final consumers, using as an
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essential input the upstream telecommunications infrastructure of vertically-integrated firms
that also operate in the downstream market.
In the United States, the linkLine antitrust decision2 involved just such vertical
relationships. The dispute was between four California internet service providers (ISPs) of
retail digital subscriber line (DSL) internet access, who purchased wholesale transmission
services from the vertically-integrated Pacific Bell Telephone Co. (later, and in what
follows, AT&T), which itself supplied DSL internet access to the retail market.3 In July
2003, the ISPs filed a private antitrust suit alleging that AT&T had monopolized and
attempted to monopolize the regional DSL market in violation of Section 2 of the Sherman
Act (503 F. 3d 876 at 878), via (among other ways) ‘‘creat[ing] a price squeeze by charging
ISP[s] a high wholesale price in relation to the price at which defendants were providing
retail services.’’
The ISPs prevailed in District Court and the Circuit Court of Appeals, and AT&T turned
to the Supreme Court. In its opinion, the Supreme Court saw no need to view ‘‘price squeeze’’
as a distinct exclusionary strategy for antitrust purposes. It decomposed ‘‘vertical price
squeeze’’ into two parts, each of which could be treated according to existing antitrust
standards. First, the high wholesale price that is the lower prong of a price squeeze is an exercise
of monopoly power, which for antitrust economics is the ability to control price or exclude
competition. The exercise of lawfully obtained market power does not offend the Sherman Act
Section 2 prohibition of monopolization.4 Second, the low retail price that is the upper prong of
a price squeeze is monopolization if it is predatory; otherwise, it is not.5
In dictum, the Supreme Court rejected application of an approach suggested by the
American Antitrust Institute in a friend-of-the-court brief, the ‘‘transfer price rule’’ (TPR), to
vertical price squeezes.6 The TPR would find a monopolization violation of Section 2 if (555
U.S. 454) ‘‘the upstream monopolist could not have made a profit by selling at its retail rates if
it purchased inputs at its own wholesale rates.’’
When it rejected use of the TPR, the Supreme Court did so without analysis of its impact
on market performance, simply stating (555 U.S. 454):
Whether or not that test is administrable, it lacks any grounding in our antitrust jurisprudence.
An upstream monopolist with no duty to deal is free to charge whatever wholesale price it
would like; antitrust law does not forbid lawfully obtained monopolies from charging
monopoly prices.
2 Pacific Bell Telephone Co. et al. v. linkLine Communications, Inc., et al., 555 U.S. 438 (2009).
3 The linkLine decisions treated DSL internet access as the relevant product market. At this time and in this geographic
market, DSL, dial-up, and cable modem were alternatives available to final consumers. The outcomes of these
decisions did not, however, turn on the question of product market definition.
4 In contrast, under Article 102 of the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union the exercise of market power
may be considered an abuse of a dominant position. See the ‘Vertical Exclusion under EU Competition Policy’ section.
5 Under, inter alia, Brooke Group, a price is predatory if it is below an appropriate measure of unit cost and if the firm
charging the price would have an objectively reasonable expectation of recouping profits lost while setting a predatory
price. EU competition policy takes demonstration of a price below unit cost as establishing that a firm expected to be
able to recoup predatory losses; no separate demonstration of recoupment is required to find that a price below unit
cost abuses a dominant position (Tetra Pak II [Case C-333/94 P Tetra Pak International SA v. Commission 1996 ECR
I-5951] " 44, Wanadoo [France Te´le´com SA v. Commission Case C-202/07 P-], 33).
6 One author of this article is a member of the Advisory Board of the American Antitrust Institute. He was not involved
in any way in preparation of the aforementioned brief.
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In this article, we analyze the impact of the TPR on market performance. We do so in a
model of price-setting duopoly with linear demand for horizontally differentiated products, and
we allow for differences between firms in fixed cost and sunk entry cost.7
To preview our results, if the downstream unit of the vertically integrated firm has low unit
cost, its downstream unit would satisfy the TPR for the unconstrained wholesale price of the
essential input. If the varieties of the two firms are close substitutes, the vertically-integrated
firm will refuse to deal with the downstream firm whether or not the TPR is in place. In either
case, the TPR does not affect the integrated firm’s decisions.
Outside of these two cases, the TPR alters the integrated firm’s decisions in one of two
ways. Either it continues to supply the downstream firm, but on terms (a combination of lower
wholesale price and higher output price) that allow the integrated firm’s downstream unit to
‘‘pseudo–break even,’’ satisfying the TPR, or it refuses to supply the downstream firm, even
though it would find it profitable to do so if the TPR were not in effect. Some welfare
consequences of the TPR depend on the degree of product differentiation, but in general we
find that the TPR increases consumer surplus, net social welfare, or both if both firms remain
active in the downstream market. If the TPR induces the upstream firm to refuse to supply the
downstream firm when it would otherwise choose downstream duopoly, consumer surplus, net
social welfare, or both are reduced.
We review related work in section 2 and outline our basic analytical framework in section
3. In section 4 we analyze the upstream firm’s equilibrium choice of distribution mode if it is
not subject to the TPR. In section 5 we discuss the implications of the TPR for the upstream
firm’s equilibrium choice of distribution mode and for market performance. Section 8
concludes. An outline of derivations is given in the Appendix at the end of this article; complete
derivations are contained in an appendix that is available from the authors on request.
2. Literature Review
Our topic touches on work in four distinct but related areas: U.S. antitrust decisions, the
antitrust economics literature on exclusion generally and vertical exclusionary strategies in
particular, the regulation of vertically-integrated firms, and the treatment of vertical price
squeezes under EU competition policy.8
Antitrust Decisions
As noted above, two early U.S. monopolization decisions involved vertical price squeezes.
One of the dominant firms that emerged in U.S. markets at the start of the twentieth century
was the Corn Products Refining Company, which at its formation in 1906 accounted for 91%
7 In Martin and Vandekerckhove (2010), we allowed as well for vertical product differentiation and obtained results
generally similar to those presented here. We discuss the more general model in section 7.
8 There is a broader literature on transfer pricing within firms. What Raimondos-Møller and Scharf (2002, p. 230) refer
to as the ‘‘arm’s length’’ standard for transfer pricing within multinational firms, that ‘‘a transfer price is deemed
appropriate if it is equal to the price at which two independent arm’s length parties would trade,’’ is similar in spirit to
the TPR. We thank a referee for this reference.
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of corn ground in the United States, all glucose, and 64% of starch production.9 Watkins (1927,
p. 210) describes the business as an ‘‘ordinary manufacturing industry [in which] no economies
in production are to be gained, simply by combining numerous widely scattered plants, which
outweigh the potential wastes of a cumbrous administration.’’ Corn Products Refining faced
competition from entrants and pursued a number of strategies to maintain its market position,
including retroactive loyalty rebates, inducing railroads to raise rivals’ rates, the use of a
‘‘bogus independent’’ to set selective (targeting rivals’ customers) predatory prices, and a
vertical price squeeze, making the price of mixed syrup and the glucose from which it was made
‘‘substantially an equality,’’ leaving no margin for independent mixers. Judge Hand found that
Corn Products Refining sold its Karo brand mixed syrup at a loss. There was also a refusal to
deal (234 F. 964 at 1006). But he concluded that the plan to exclude mixers ‘‘from their
subindustry’’ had not succeeded ‘‘to the extent that [Corn Products Refining] planned,’’ and he
found the company guilty of attempting to monopolize mixed syrups but not of
monopolization.
Some 25 years later, one of the practices for which the government reproached Alcoa, the
Aluminum Company of America, in the antitrust suit that began in 1941, was squeezing the
margin between the price of aluminum ingot sold to independent rollers and the price of sheet
aluminum (148 F. 2d 416 at 437):
The plaintiff’s theory is that ‘‘Alcoa’’ consistently sold ingot at so high a price that the ‘‘sheet
rollers,’’ who were forced to buy from it, could not pay the expenses of ‘‘rolling’’ the ‘‘sheet’’
and make a living profit out of the price at which ‘‘Alcoa’’ itself sold ‘‘sheet.’’
Judge Hand’s characterization of Alcoa’s vertical pricing as failing to allow downstream
rollers ‘‘a living profit’’ has received two very different readings. For Sidak (2008, p. 283), for
example, it embodies a protectionist vision of anti-monopolization law: ‘‘Judge Hand’s key
concept—that a competitor is entitled to receive a ‘‘living profit’’—is irreconcilable with the
consumer-welfare objective of antitrust law that the Supreme Court and the antitrust
enforcement agencies have emphasized for at least three decades.’’ Hovenkamp and
Hovenkamp, in contrast, view the 1945 circuit court opinion as protecting only the opportunity
for nonintegrated firms to demonstrate in the marketplace that they are as efficient as the
downstream unit of the integrated firm (2009, pp. 474–5):10
While Judge Hand wrote of the independent fabricator’s legal entitlement to a ‘‘fair price’’ from
Alcoa, he in fact employed a cost-based test. The test was that the margin between the price at
which Alcoa sold sheet to the independent rollers and its own resale price for rolled aluminum
must be at least sufficient to cover the costs that Alcoa itself incurred for the same set of
processes. In other words, Judge Hand applied a somewhat primitive version of an ‘‘equally
efficient rival’’ test, such as the one that Judge Posner has advocated for unlawful exclusionary
conduct assessed under Section 2 of the Sherman Act.
We develop a formal model that permits assessment of the impact of a rule that protects
the opportunity of an equally-efficient downstream rival to compete on consumer welfare.
9 For details, see U.S. v. Corn Products Refining 234 F. 964 at 968-975 or Watkins (1927, pp. 201–11).
10 We omit two footnotes, one of which cites Posner (2001, pp. 194–5).
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Antitrust Economics
Limiting the ability of dominant firms to exclude equally-efficient rivals is one of the two
pillars—the other being prohibition of collusion—upon which U.S. antitrust policy was erected
(Klebaner 1964; Baker 2012). Over the more than 30 years during which he wrote on trusts,
John Bates Clark (1900a, b, elsewhere) came to favor the kinds of policies eventually embodied
in the 1914 Clayton Act—prohibiting predatory pricing, price discrimination that distorted
competition,11 and exclusive dealing contracts between manufacturers and distributors—that
he believed would fortify the (Clark 1904) ‘‘saving grace’’ of potential competition.12 This being
done, he saw no need to limit the ability of the large firm to compete (1900b, p. 195): ‘‘Make the
independent competitor safe and let prices be gauged by the cost of the goods that are made in
his well-equipped establishment. Let him make a fair living; and if the trust, by real economy,
makes a better living, no one will complain.’’
The articles in the literature that come closest to our contribution are those of Carlton
(2008) and Vickers (2010). Carlton reaches a negative conclusion about imposing antitrust
liability for vertical price squeezes. He sets up his discussion as follows (pp. 271–2, footnote
omitted):
Assume that Product A is a necessary input in the production of Product B and that Product B
is produced in a fixed proportion to the quantity of Product A used as an input. Although it has
no effect on the results, assume for exposition that one unit of Product A is required to produce
one unit of Product B. Assume that Firm 1 is a vertically integrated producer of Product A and
Product B. Assume that Firm 2 purchases Product A from Firm 1 at price PA and sells Product
B at price B in competition with Firm 1. Furthermore, assume that Firm 1 is a monopolist seller
of Product A. Suppose Firm 2’s profit margin (PB{PA) declines to a level so low that Firm 2
exits the market. Should Firm 1’s actions be subject to condemnation under the antitrust laws
because it leads to some harm that is not actionable under other antitrust causes of action and,
if so, under what circumstances?
For Carlton (2008, p. 275), the case that the downstream market can be treated as if it is
perfectly competitive is ‘‘the standard one.’’13 While he discusses the way product
differentiation in the downstream market affects results, his base model is one in which the
product traded in the downstream market is homogeneous. Vickers (2010) maintains the
assumption of downstream product homogeneity and treats nonintegrated firms in the
downstream market as a price-taking fringe.
In contrast to these approaches, the price squeeze claims that have been the basis of
antitrust disputes involve imperfectly competitive downstream markets and markets that (like
most markets) are for differentiated products. We differentiate our own work from these two
contributions by formally modelling the impact of a rule that defines vertical pricing that
violates the TPR as monopolization on market performance if the downstream market is
imperfectly competitive and downstream varieties are differentiated.
11 It was price discrimination of the kind typified by railroad rate discrimination that was the target of this policy
approach. Such discrimination enabled the rise of Standard Oil (Prouty 1900; Granitz and Klein 1996); the American
Sugar Refining Company benefited from similar arrangements.
12 See Gordon (1963) on the early views of Clark and others before passage of the Sherman Act in 1890 and Gilbert
(1989) for a survey of the economic literature on the impact of potential competition on market performance.
13 If the downstream market is perfectly competitive, then the Chicago School ‘‘single monopoly profit argument’’ holds,
and a vertical price squeeze cannot increase the upstream firm’s economic profit. The Chicago argument fails if the
downstream market is imperfectly competitive; see, for example, Hart and Tirole (1990).
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Regulation
There is a large body of literature on the pricing of essential inputs across vertically-related
industries, some of which are regulated. Much of this work examines telecommunications
pricing policy under alternative regulatory regimes. In this context, King and Maddock (2002)
discuss alternative ‘‘imputation rules.’’14 Such rules correspond to the TPR (2002, p. 48):
An imputation rule can detect a price squeeze. The rule evaluates the integrated firm’s pricing
policy as if it faced the same access costs as its non-integrated retail competitors. As a result, the
rule detects when prices are unviable for (equally efficient) retail competitors.
The terminology ‘‘imputation rule’’ arises because (Hausman and Tardiff 1995, p. 543,
emphasis added) ‘‘the price [the upstream firm] charges to competitors is imputed into its own
price for competing services with cost differences in providing the monopoly service element
being recognized so that economic efficiency is achieved ….’’15 Our work differs from the
analysis that appears in this literature in that we model pricing in unregulated vertically-related
industries.
Noll (1995, p. 502) observes that ‘‘Most policy disputes in telecommunications refer to
vertical foreclosure’’ and that ‘‘A firm with market power can follow two types of vertical
foreclosure strategies: refusal to deal, and exclusionary pricing’’ (p. 503). Noll defines a price
structure as exclusionary ‘‘if prices in a monopolized market disadvantage competitors in a
vertically related market’’ (p. 505), and he discusses vertical price squeezes as an exclusionary
strategy. He comments that ‘‘The unfortunate downside to price squeeze claims is that any cure
may introduce regulations guaranteeing minimum retail margins that keep inefficient
competitors in business’’ (1995, p. 506). This is a downside that the TPR avoids.
Vertical Exclusion under EU Competition Policy
The European Commission and the European Courts have applied the TPR, although not
by that name.16 In its 2003 Deutsche Telekom decision,17 the Commission wrote (} 140) that
a margin squeeze occurs if the spread between [Deutsche Telecom’s] retail and wholesale prices
is either negative or at least insufficient to cover [Deutsche Telekom’s] own downstream costs.
This would mean that [Deutsche Telekom] would have been unable to offer its own retail
services without incurring a loss if, during the period under investigation, i.e. since 1998, it had
had to pay the wholesale access price as an internal transfer price for its own retail operations.
This rule, which maintains the opportunity for a nonintegrated downstream firm to
compete, appears in the Commission’s 1988 Notice on the application of the competition rules to
14 Hausman and Tardiff (1995, p. 543, emphasis added): ‘‘The imputation rule states that a LEC will be required to
provide ‘monopoly service elements’ where the price it charges to competitors is imputed into its own price for competing
services with cost differences in providing the monopoly service element being recognized so that economic efficiency
is achieved ….’’
15 See Polo (2007) for an exposition of conditions under which the TPR is equivalent to the efficient component pricing
rule of Baumol and Sidak (1994).
16 SeeWanadoo (cited in footnote 5), Deutsche Telekom (Case C-280-08 P 14 October 2010 (ECJ), TeliaSonera Case C-52/
09 17 February 2011 (ECJ) (TeliaSonera). For discussions, see Grout (2003), Motta and de Streel (2006), Polo (2007),
Clerckx and De Muyter (2009), and Hay and McMahon (2012).
17 Commission Decision of 21 May 2003 Deutsche Telekom AG [2003] OJ L263/9, 14.10.2003. See, similarly, the
Commission’s 1988 British Sugar decision, [1988] OJ L 284 [1988], " 66.
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access agreements in the telecommunications sector.18 That Notice also raises the possibility that
abuse by a dominant firm might be found if the downstream margin is (emphasis added)
‘‘insufficient to allow a reasonably efficient service provider in the downstream market to obtain
a normal profit.’’
Clerckx and De Muyter (2009) defend the reasonably-efficient competitor standard that
emphasizes that dominant telecom firms in EU member-state markets tend to have inherited
their positions from a state enterprise or regulatory past. Be that as it may, it is subject to
skepticism on at least two grounds, one of principle and one from the point of view of
application. The objection in principle is that it might protect less efficient downstream firms
from the competition of more efficient vertically-integrated firms. The practical objection is
that a ‘‘reasonably efficient downstream firm’’ test would require the upstream firm to know
the costs of its rival to avoid offending competition policy, while the TPR requires only that the
upstream firm know the costs of its own downstream unit.
3. Setup
We model a vertically-structured market in which one firm, firm A, is the monopoly
supplier of an essential input for production of a final good. We suppose that one unit of the
essential input is required to produce one unit of the final product and that the essential input is
produced at constant marginal cost, which, for simplicity, we normalize to be 0. Vertical price
squeezes have been an issue in cases in which upstream and downstream markets are small-
numbers oligopolies. We assume that the essential input is supplied by one firm and focus on a
downstream market—this may be thought of as one of several nonoverlapping regional
markets—that is supplied by at most one nonintegrated firm. By focusing on the limiting case
of one upstream and one downstream firm, we avoid highlighting horizontal relationships
among firms operating at the same horizontal level at the expense of the vertical relationships
upon which we wish to focus.19
Demand
We allow for horizontal product differentiation in the final good market by using the
standard Spence-Dixit-Vives linear demand specification. Without loss of generality, we
normalize the price-axis intercept of the inverse demand equation to be 1 and the slope of the
inverse demand equation to be {1. The inverse rate of demand equation for variety i is
pi~1{qi{sqj, ð1Þ
where (here and henceforth) i, j~A, B and i=j. s is a horizontal product differentiation
parameter. We assume 0ƒsv1. s~0 implies varieties are independent in demand. In the
limiting case s~1, varieties are perfect substitutes.
18 OJ 98/C 265/02, " 117. The ‘‘reasonably efficient competitor’’ test appears in " 118.
19 By allowing at most one independent downstream firm, we also rule out ‘‘hold up’’ effects in vertical relationships of
the kind considered by Hart and Tirole (1990).
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As is well known, inverse demand equations of this form can be derived from a quadratic
social welfare function
U~HzqAzqB{
1
2
q2Az2sqAqBzq
2
B
 
, ð2Þ
where H is a Hicksian composite good, price normalized to 1, produced by a perfectly
competitive industry under conditions of constant returns to scale. We use Equation 2 for
welfare calculations.
In what follows, we model price-setting firms and work with the demand equations
implied by Equation 1,
qA~
1
1{s2
1{s{pAzspBð Þ ð3Þ
and
qB~
1
1{s2
1{s{pBzspAð Þ: ð4Þ
We treat time as continuous; Equations 3 and 4 are the rates of demand per unit time period.
Cost
If firm i enters the downstream market, it incurs a completely sunk entry cost Ei (i~A,B)
and fixed cost at the rate Fi per unit time. It also incurs a constant marginal cost per unit of
output for all inputs other than the essential input produced by firm A. Without loss of
generality, and for notational simplicity, we normalize this marginal cost to be 0.
Sequence
There are at most three stages in the market (Figure 1). In stage I, firm A chooses the
structure of the supply side of the downstream market (Figure 2). Firm A may choose to supply
the downstream market as a monopolist, refusing to supply firm B with the essential input and
so excluding it from the final good market. Firm A may choose downstream duopoly,
integrating downstream and competing with firm B, to which it supplies the essential input at
wholesale price v. The third possibility is nonintegration: Firm A may operate only upstream,
leaving firm B, which again purchases the essential input at wholesale price v, as the monopoly
supplier of the downstream market.
In stage II, which occurs only if firm A opts for downstream duopoly or nonintegration,
firm A sets the wholesale price v. We treat constructive refusal, in which firm A announces that
it will supply the essential input to firm B at a price that makes it uneconomic for firm B to
Figure 1. Sequence of Decisions
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purchase the essential input, as a form of exclusion. Thus, if firm A opts for duopoly
distribution, it sets a wholesale price that maximizes firm A’s value, assuming that firm B earns
at least a normal rate of return on investment. We assume that firm B enters the downstream
market if and only if entry will allow it to earn at least a normal rate of return on investment.
Finally, in stage III, firms that are active in the downstream market set prices to maximize
own present-discounted value over all future time. If there is downstream duopoly, prices are
set non-cooperatively. The game is solved backward.
4. Alternative Final Market Structures
We first consider firm A’s equilibrium choice of downstream market structure, and the
resulting market performance, if the TPR is not in place.
Firm A Monopoly/Firm B Monopoly
If firm A refuses to supply firm B with the essential input, or if it withdraws from the
downstream market, the downstream market is a monopoly supplied at constant marginal cost.
Marginal cost is normalized to be 0 if firm A is the monopoly supplier and v if firm B is the
monopoly supplier.
As noted above, we treat time as continuous. Then if, for example, firm A excludes firm B,
its objective function is its present discounted value,
VexA ~{Ez
1
r
1{qexA
 
qexA{FA
 
~
1
r
1{qexA
 
qexA{ FAzrEAð Þ
 
~
1
r
1{qexA
 
qexA{kA
 
,
ð5Þ
where the interest rate r is used to discount income, and for notational compactness we write
ki~FizrEi ð6Þ
for the sum of firm i’s flow fixed and capitalized sunk entry cost.
Figure 2. Alternative Downstream Market Structures
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It is straightforward to arrive at the equilibrium characteristics of the two monopoly
regimes, and these are given in Table 1.
Note from Table 1 that the monopoly values of the two firms are
VmA~
1
r
1
4
{kA
 
ð7Þ
and
VmB~
1
r
1
16
{kB
 
,
respectively.
If kAw
1
4
, firm A would never choose to be the monopoly supply of the downstreammarket,
and if
kB
r
w 1
16
, firm B would never agree to be the monopoly supply of the downstream market.
So as not to rule out either exclusion or nonintegration by assumption, in what follows we assume
kAƒ
1
4
, ð8Þ
and
kBƒ
1
16
, ð9Þ
and so limit our attention to cases in which any one of the distribution regimes is a feasible
equilibrium outcome. In the present context, Inequalities 8 and 9 correspond to the standard
assumption that fixed cost is small enough, relative to market size, that a monopolist would not
lose money.
Downstream Duopoly
Stage III: Retail Prices
If firm A opts for duopoly in the final good market, firms A and B compete as price-
setting duopolists in stage III. Firm B takes as given the wholesale price v set by firm A in stage
II. Firm A’s objective function is the present value of the sum of its profit from sales of the final
good and its profit from sales to firm B of the essential input,
Table 1. Equilibrium Outcomes, Final Good Market Monopoly
Firm A Monopoly Firm B Monopoly
v NA 1/2
qA 1/2 NA
qB NA 1/4
p 1/2 3/4
rVA 1
4
{kA
1/8
rVB NA 1
16
{kB
rCS 1/8 1/32
rNSW 3
8
{kA
7
32
{kB
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Vdd3A ~
1
r
pAqA pA,pBð Þ{kAzvqB pA,pBð Þ½ , ð10Þ
where qA pA,pBð Þ and qB pA,pBð Þ are the demand Equations 3 and 4.
Firm B’s objective function is the present value of profit from its sales of the final good,
Vdd3B ~
1
r
pB{vð Þqdd3B pA,pBð Þ{kB
 
: ð11Þ
The first-order conditions to maximize Equations 10 and 11 are linear equations that can be
solved for equilibrium prices as functions of v. All other equilibrium characteristics of
interest—quantities demanded qdd2A vð Þ and qdd2B vð Þ, values, and consumer surplus—follow
directly from the equilibrium prices and are given in the Appendix.
Stage II: Wholesale Price
In stage II, firm A picks the downstream duopoly wholesale price v to solve
max
v
Vdd2A ~
1
r
pA vð Þqdd2A vð Þ{kAzvqdd2B vð Þ
  ð12Þ
(see also Eqn. 31), subject to firm B’s downstream duopoly participation constraint,
Vdd2B vð Þ~
1
r
1{s
1zs
2zs{2 1zsð Þv
4{s2
 	2
{kB
( )
§0: ð13Þ
The solution is one of two types, depending on whether the constraint is or is not binding. If
firm B’s participation constraint is not binding, the value-maximizing wholesale price is
vdd~
1
2
8zs3
8zs2
, ð14Þ
and firm B’s equilibrium value satisfies
VddB ~
1
r
1{s
1zs
2zs2
8zs2
 2
{kB
" #
§0: ð15Þ
That is, for
kBƒ
1{s
1zs
2zs2
8zs2
 2
~kB ð16Þ
—small kB, given s, or small s, varieties are weak substitutes, given kB—firm B’s participation
constraint is not binding.
If Equation 16 does not hold, vdd would make firm B’s value negative. If firm B’s
participation constraint is binding, firm A must reduce v below vdd , allowing firm B to break
even.20 From Equation 13, the participation-constrained wholesale price, the price that makes
firm B’s value 0, is
20 We make a tie-breaking assumption that if firm A’s dual distribution value is 0, it is willing to sell its variety of the
product.
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vcdd~
1
2
2zs
1zs
1{ 2{sð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1zs
1{s
kB
r" #
: ð17Þ
For given s, vcdd and firm A’s constrained downstream duopoly value VcddA fall as kB rises. For
given kB, v
cdd and VcddA fall as s rises (as varieties become closer substitutes).
One meets in the literature observations along the lines of those of Grout (2003, p. 78,
footnote 10): ‘‘in many cases, the vertically integrated company will have no wish to exclude a
more efficient downstream competitor providing it can extract more upstream profit by using
the more efficient competitor rather than its own channels.’’ For kBwkB, a dominant upstream
firm would reduce the wholesale price to keep a downstream rival in the market precisely
because by so doing it is able to sell the essential input to the downstream rival.
Equilibrium Choice of Downstream Market Structure: No TPR
In stage I, firm A will maximize value with downstream duopoly if
VddA §max V
m
A ,V
m
A
 
, ð18Þ
where VddA is either the unconstrained or the constrained stage II value, depending on whether
firm B’s participation constraint is or is not binding.
From Table 1, on the right-hand side we have
r max VexA ,V
ni
A
 
~max
1
4
{kA,
1
8
 
~
1
8
1
8
ƒkAƒ
1
4
1
4
{kA 0ƒkAƒ
1
8
8><
>: : ð19Þ
Firm A’s choice is between downstream duopoly and own monopoly for 0ƒkAƒ
1
8
, between
downstream duopoly and firm B monopoly for
1
8
ƒkAƒ
1
4
. We discuss the low-kA case here.
Considering Inequality 9, this allows a maximum kA that is twice as great as the maximum kB.
We discuss the high-kA case,
1
8
ƒkAƒ
1
4
, which is qualitatively similar, in an appendix that is
available on request from the authors.
If firm B’s participation constraint is not binding, firm A’s downstream duopoly value
exceeds its exclusion value,
VddA ~
1
4
z
1{s
1zsð Þ 8zs2ð Þ{kAw
1
4
{kA: ð20Þ
Thus, if firm B’s participation constraint is met (kBƒkB), firm A supplies firm B with the
essential input at wholesale price (Eqn. 14), and the downstream market is a duopoly in which
firm B has positive value. For kB greater than but close to k

B, firm A maximizes value by setting
the constrained downstream duopoly price (Eqn. 17). Firm B’s value is 0, meaning it earns just
a normal rate of return on investment. The larger is kB, the lower is v
cdd , and the lower is firm
A’s constrained downstream duopoly payoff. For
kBƒ
1{s
1zs
2zs2z2
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1{s2
p
8zs2
 !2
:kB , ð21Þ
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firm A’s constrained downstream duopoly payoff is at least as great as its own-monopoly
payoff. For kBwkB , firm A maximizes value by excluding firm B from the market.
If the TPR is not a factor, firm A’s choice of downstream market structure depends on
product substitutability, s, and on kB. Summarizing the results, we have
THEOREM 1. If 0ƒkAƒ
1
8
,
(a) for
0ƒkBƒkB,
firm B’s participation constraint is met if firm A sets wholesale price vdd , and firm A maximizes
value if the downstream market is a duopoly;
(b) for
kBvkBƒmin
1
16
,kB
 
,
firm B’s participation constraint is met if firm A sets wholesale price vcdd , and firm A
maximizes value if the downstream market is a duopoly;
(c) for s such that there is a range of kB satisfying
kB vkBƒ
1
16
,
firm A’s value-maximizing choice is to exclude firm B and supply the downstream market as a
monopolist.
Theorem 1 is illustrated in Figure 3. For a given value of kB, if varieties are weak
substitutes (s small), firm A can set the unconstrained downstream duopoly price and leave
firm B positive value. Firm B’s value is smaller for larger values of s. For intermediate values of
s, firm A must set v below vdd for firm B to just break even. For sufficiently large s, the
reduction in v required to keep firm B in the market makes firm A’s constrained downstream
duopoly value less than its exclusion value.
Alternatively, for 0ƒsƒ0:56871, firm A’s value-maximizing distribution choice passes
from unconstrained to constrained downstream duopoly as kB rises. For 0:56871vsƒ1, there
is an upper range of kB over which firm A opts to exclude firm B and supply the downstream
market as a monopolist.
Figure 3. Firm A’s Choice of Downstream Market Structure, Low kA.
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5. The TPR
When Binding?
If the TPR is in effect, a pA,vð Þ-pair that would not allow firm A’s downstream operation
to realize a nonnegative pseudo-profit if it had to purchase the essential input on the same terms
as firm B would be defined as a price squeeze monopolization violation of Section 2 of the
Sherman Act or abuse of a dominant position in violation of Section 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union.21 To avoid such findings, the pseudo-value of firm A’s
downstream unit,
V^AD~
1
r
pA{vð ÞqA{kA½ , ð22Þ
must be nonnegative.
V^AD satisfies
V^AD~
1
r
1{s
1zs
2zs{ 4zsð Þv½  2zs{s 1zsð Þv½ 
4{s2ð Þ2
{kA
( )
: ð23Þ
When would the TPR be a binding constraint on firm A’s choice of v?
For 0vkBƒkB (that is, in the lower left region of Figure 3), the wholesale price vdd satisfies
firm B’s participation constraint. If we evaluate Equation 23 for vdd , the TPR is satisfied for
kAƒ
1
4
s 1{sð Þ 2zsð Þ2 4{szs2 
1zsð Þ 8zs2ð Þ2
:k^A: ð24Þ
For kBvkBƒkB (in the central region of Figure 3), without the TPR firm A would set wholesale
price vcdd . If we evaluate Equation 23 for vcdd , the TPR is satisfied for
kAƒ~kA:
1
4
1{s
1zsð Þ2 {1z 4zsð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1zs
1{s
kB
r" #
1zs
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
1zs
1{s
kB
r !
: ð25Þ
If the wholesale price vdd satisfies firm B’s participation constraint, the threshold value of kA at
which the TPR becomes a binding constraint, k^A, is independent of kB. The threshold is drawn in
Figure 4, and for the case that firm B’s participation constraint is satisfied without the TPR, the
TPR rule is a binding constraint above the V^AD~0, kA~k^A line. If, without the TPR, firm B’s
participation constraint is binding and firm A sets wholesale pricevcdd , the threshold ~kA at which
the TPR becomes a binding constraint depends on the value of kB.
22
If Binding
If V^ cddADv0 and firm A makes the downstream market a duopoly, the TPR is a binding
constraint when firm A chooses v. In this case, firm A sets v so V^AD~0 (positive V^AD would
21 This presupposes that firm A has a position of monopoly power for the purposes of U.S. antitrust law or a dominant
position for the purposes of EU competition policy.
22 The threshold is drawn in three-dimensional diagrams in an appendix that is available on request from the authors.
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needlessly reduce firm A’s value), anticipating the resulting prices that will be set in stage III
(Stage III: Retail Prices). This wholesale price is
vtpr~ 2zsð Þ
4z2szs2{ 2{sð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2zsð Þ2z4s 4zsð Þ 1zsð Þ
2
1{s
kA
s
2s 1zsð Þ 4zsð Þ : ð26Þ
As one would expect, under the TPR, firm A must set a lower v, the greater is kA. Firm A’s
TPR-constrained value must be less than its value without the TPR. The lower wholesale price
that comes with the TPR means that firm B’s value must be greater if the TPR is in effect than if
it is not. It follows that if firm B’s participation constraint is satisfied without the TPR, it is
satisfied with the TPR.
Equilibrium Choice of Downstream Market Structure: TPR
By the argument made in connection with Equation 19, for 0ƒkAƒ
1
8
firm A will choose
either downstream duopoly or exclusion. If the TPR is in effect, Equation 26 gives the
wholesale price if firm A chooses to make the downstream market a duopoly. Firm A prefers
TPR-constrained downstream duopoly to exclusion for
V
tpr
A §V
ex
A ~
1
r
1
4
{kA
 
, ð27Þ
and on some manipulation this condition becomes
kAƒ^^kA~
1
4s
1{s
1zsð Þ2 4zsð Þ
2zsð Þ 8z2s2zs3 z2s 4zsð Þ ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi1{s2p
8zs2
" #2
{ 2zsð Þ2
8<
:
9=
;: ð28Þ
Since firm B’s participation constraint is satisfied if firm A sets v~vtpr, we have
THEOREM 2. If 0ƒkAƒ
1
8
,
(a) for 0vkBƒkB and kAƒk^A or kBvkBƒkB and kAƒ~kA, the TPR is not a binding
constraint; firm A chooses downstream duopoly and sets wholesale price vdd ;
Figure 4. Firm A’s Choice of Downstream Market Structure under the TPR, If the No-TPR Choice Is
Unconstrained Downstream Duopoly
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(b) for 0vkBƒkB and k^AƒkAƒmin
1
8
,
^^
kA
 
or kBvkBƒkB and ~kAƒkAƒmin
1
8
,
^^
kA
 
,
the TPR is a binding constraint; firm A chooses downstream duopoly and sets wholesale price
vtpr;
(c) for s such that there is a range of kA satisfying
^^
kAvkAƒ
1
8
, firm A’s value-maximizing
choice is to exclude firm B and supply the downstream market as a monopolist.
Theorem 2 is illustrated in Figure 4 for the 0vkBƒkB case (firm B’s participation
constraint satisfied without the TPR), which shows the V
tpr
A ~V
ex
A (or equivalently kA~
^^
kA)
line.23 For given kA, there is a threshold value of the substitutability parameter s above which
firm A maximizes value by excluding firm B from the downstream market. There is no analytic
solution for the threshold value of s. Alternatively, if varieties are weak substitutes,
0ƒsƒ0:32956, firm A will opt for TPR-constrained downstream duopoly for all kA in the
0ƒkAƒ
1
8
. For 0:32956vsƒ1, there is a threshold value of kA above which the reduction in v
required to satisfy the TPR rule is so great that firm A maximizes value by excluding firm B
from the downstream market.24
6. The TPR, Firm A’s Choice of Downstream Market Structure, and
Welfare Consequences
If the TPR is not in effect, firm A’s choice of downstream market structure depends on kB
and s (Figure 3). If the TPR is in effect, firm A’s choice of downstream market structure
depends on kA, kB, and s (Theorem 2). The impact of the TPR on firm A’s choice of
downstream market structure partitions kA,kB,sð Þ-space25 into seven regions. In three of these
regions, the TPR has no impact on firm A’s choice of downstream market structure, either
because the TPR is not a binding constraint or because firm A excludes firm B from the
downstream market whether or not the TPR is in effect. In two of the regions, firm A chooses
downstream duopoly with or without the TPR, setting the lower wholesale price vcdd if the
TPR is in effect. In two of the regions, firm A opts for downstream duopoly without the TPR,
exclusion with the TPR. The inequalities defining the various regions are summarized in
THEOREM 3. (a) for 0vkBƒkB and
N (Region 1) kAƒk^A, the TPR is not a binding constraint;
N (Region 2) k^AƒkAƒmin ^^kA, 1
8
 
, firm A chooses unconstrained downstream duopoly
without the TPR, TPR-constrained downstream duopoly with the TPR;
N (Region 3) ^^kAƒkAƒ 1
8
, for s where there is such a range, firm A chooses unconstrained
downstream duopoly without the TPR, exclusion with the TPR;
23 For kBvkBƒkB , (s, kA)-space is similarly partitioned into three regions. As noted above, for this case the threshold
below which the TPR is not a binding constraint depends on kB.
24 The point that equilibrium market structure depends on the rules of the competitive game is not new to antitrust. In its
1967 Schwinn decision (U.S. v. Arnold, Schwinn & Co. et al., 388 U.S. 365 (1967), the U.S. Supreme Court held that
Schwinn could not impose nonprice restraints on independent distributors that had taken title to bicycles intended for
resale. Following this decision, Schwinn internalized the distribution function, cutting off distributors with which it
had had decades-long relationships.
25 Where 0ƒkAƒ
1
8
, 0ƒkBƒ
1
16
, and 0 # s # 1.
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(b) for kBvkBƒkB and
N (Region 4) kAƒ~kA, the TPR is not a binding constraint;
N (Region 5) ~kAvkAƒmin ^^kA, 1
8
 
, firm A chooses constrained downstream duopoly
without the TPR, TPR-constrained downstream duopoly with the TPR;
N (Region 6) ^^kAƒkAƒ 1
8
, for s where there is such a range, firm A chooses constrained
downstream duopoly without the TPR, exclusion with the TPR;
(c) (Region 7) for kB vkBƒ
1
16
, if such a range exists, firm A will choose to supply the
downstream market as a monopolist whether or not the TPR is in effect.
The regions are irregularly shaped, but the regions where the TPR makes a difference for
firm A’s choices may be approximately described as follows.26
Region 2 is roughly all kA, low to intermediate s, and low to intermediate kB. Region 3 is
roughly all kA, intermediate to high s, and low to intermediate kB. Thus, for low kB (kBƒkB), it
is high product substitutability that is conducive to exclusion under the TPR. Region 5 is
roughly low to intermediate kA, low to intermediate s, and intermediate to high kB. Region 6 is
roughly intermediate to high kA, intermediate s, and intermediate to high kB. Thus, for
intermediate values of kB (k

BvkBƒkB ), it is high kA that is conducive to exclusion under the
TPR.
Table 2 reports the impact of the TPR on the elements of market performance in the four
regions where the TPR alters firm A’s choices. Where the TPR is a binding constraint on firm
A’s choices, it must reduce firm A’s value, compared with the no-TPR equilibrium. Imposition
of the TPR increases firm B’s value in regions 2 and 5, where firm A supplies firm B the
essential input at a lower price than it would without the TPR. In regions 3 and 6, the TPR
means firm B is excluded from the downstream market. Its exclusion value, 0, is less than its
unconstrained downstream duopoly value (region 3) and the same as its constrained
downstream duopoly value (region 6). The TPR increases the combined value of both firms
in almost all of region 2 and in region 5; it reduces combined firm value in regions 3 and 6. The
TPR increases the present-discounted value of consumer surplus and net social welfare in
regions 3 and 5. It reduces consumer surplus in most of regions 3 and 6 and reduces net social
welfare in all of regions 3 and 6.
26 The regions are illustrated in a series of figures in an appendix that is available on request from the authors.
Table 2. Welfare Impact of the Transfer Price Rule (TPR), by Region
Region 2 3 5 6
No TPR Udd Udd Cdd Cdd
TPR TPRdd Ex TPRdd Ex
VA 2 2 2 2
VB + 2 + 0
VA + VB +* 2 + 2
CS + 2** + 2***
NSW + 2 + 2
Udd indicates unconstrained downstream duopoly; Cdd, constrained downstream duopoly; z, increase;
2, decrease. * Except for a small high-s, low-kA region; ** Except for a small high-s region; *** Except for a small
high-s, low- to intermediate-kB region. Consumer Surplus (CS) is the present discounted value of flow consumed surplus
evaluated using Equation (2). Net Social Welfare (NSW) is the sum of CS and firm values VA + VB.
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The common element of these results is that the TPR increases consumer surplus and net
social welfare if firm B remains active under the TPR. If imposition of the TPR leads firm A to
exclude firm B, consumer surplus is almost always reduced, and net social welfare is always
reduced. These results are consistent with the expectation that actual competition improves
market performance.
7. Robustness
In Martin and Vandekerckhove (2010), we explore a generalization of the model that
allows for vertical as well as horizontal product differentiation. Qualitative results are similar to
those presented here. In contrast to the equal-quality case, however, if firm B’s variety is of
much higher quality than firm A’s variety, imposition of the TPR may lead firm A not to enter
the downstream market. In such cases, the TPR reduces firm A’s value and may slightly
increase or decrease firm B’s value. Double marginalization means that consumer surplus and
net social welfare decline if the downstream market is supplied only by firm B under the TPR,
compared to duopoly supply without the TPR. Once again, the results are consistent with the
expectation that actual competition improves market performance.
8. Conclusion
The words of Section 2 of the Sherman Act refer to monopolization. The life that judicial
interpretation has breathed into this clay deals with conduct that is exclusionary. The
prohibition of abuse of a dominant position contained in Article 102 of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union is more complex, touching on exclusionary conduct but
also on the exercise of market power and evincing a special responsibility of dominant firms to
conduct themselves in such a way that competition in the single market is not distorted.
What is perhaps the classic rationale for an antimonopolization policy appears in the first
U.S. antitrust decision of which we are aware to involve a claim of vertical price squeezing:27
The national will has not declared against elimination of competitors when they fail from their
inherent industrial weakness. On the contrary, it has declared with great emphasis against any
methods by which such weaknesses might be concealed; in so doing it has assumed a positive
purpose toward industry, has established a norm to which competition must conform. This
purpose the Corn Products Refining Company has persistently and ingeniously endeavored to
thwart from the outset. Its constant effort has been to prevent competitors from that test which
would in the long run discover whether they could manufacture as well and as cheaply as itself.
The TPR, if it were in effect, would protect for nonintegrated firms the right to fail if they
are not as efficient as the downstream unit of the integrated firm. In so doing, the TPR
generally increases consumer surplus and net social welfare, provided it does not induce the
27 U.S. v. Corn Products Refining Co. et al., 234 F. 964 (1916), at 1015.
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upstream firm to exclude the downstream firm from the market, something that happens,
roughly, if varieties are good substitutes and the upstream firm has high fixed cost.28
If, as is permissible under U.S. antitrust law, a vertically-integrated firm may simply refuse
to deal with downstream competitors, the TPR can induce exclusion that would not otherwise
take place. In such cases, the TPR generally reduces consumer surplus and net social welfare. In
such cases, it is exclusion that worsens market performance and competition that improves it.
But the right of an antitrust monopolist to refuse to deal with customer/competitors is not
unlimited. The Colgate29 doctrine is that (emphasis added) ‘‘In the absence of any purpose to
create or maintain a monopoly, the [Sherman] act does not restrict the long recognized right of
trader or manufacturer engaged in an entirely private business, freely to exercise his own
independent discretion as to parties with whom he will deal.’’ linkLine permits exclusionary
intermediate good prices if the upstream firm has no ‘‘antitrust duty to deal’’ with its
downstream competitor/customers. Just when an upstream firm has, or should have, a duty to
deal with downstream firms, is itself a policy question. The impact of alternative policies
toward refusal to deal on static and dynamic market performance could also be the subject of
the kind of explicit welfare analysis we have presented for the TPR.30
Appendix
Complete details of derivations are given in a separate appendix that is available on request from the authors.
Table 1
Column 1 of Table 1 is the monopoly outcome if firm A is the unique supplier of the downstream market. Column
2 is the double marginalization outcome.
Downstream duopoly: firm B’s participation constraint met
Stage III
Substituting the demand Equations 3 and 4 into the payoff functions 10 and 11 gives the firm’s stage III objective
functions. Solving the first-order conditions to maximize these objective functions gives stage III equilibrium prices as
functions of the wholesale price,
pA~
1{sð Þ 2zsð Þz3sv
4{s2
ð29Þ
and
pB~vz 1{sð Þ 2zs{2 1zsð Þv
4{s2
: ð30Þ
29 U.S. v. Colgate & Co., 250 U.S. 300 (1919) at 307.
30 The Colgate doctrine originally meant that the manufacturer of a branded consumer good could select its distributors.
Context matters, and the welfare impact of an upstream firm’s refusal to deal in such a circumstance may be quite
different from the welfare impact of a vertically-integrated firm’s refusal to supply an essential input to downstream
competitors that market their own branded consumer goods.
28 Practical issues would need to be faced to implement the TPR, as, for example, practical issues arise in application of
the Areeda-Turner rule. Motta and de Streel (2006) have a careful discussion of issues in measuring costs for the
purpose of price squeeze analysis.
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All stage III equilibrium characteristics of interest—quantities demanded, payoffs, consumer surplus, and net social
welfare—can be obtained from the equilibrium prices. Values as functions of v are
Vdd2A ~
1
r
|
1{sð Þ 2zsð Þ2z 1zsð Þ 2zsð Þ 4{2szs2 v{ 1zsð Þ 8zs2 v2
1zsð Þ 4{s2ð Þ2
{kA
" #
ð31Þ
and
Vdd2B ~
1
r
1{s
1zs
2zs{2 1zsð Þv
4{s2
 	2
{kB
( )
: ð32Þ
Equations 31 and 32 correspond to Equations 12 and 13, respectively.
Vdd2A is firm A’s stage II objective function. V
dd2
B must be nonnegative for firm B’s participation constraint to be
met.
v
The first-order condition to maximize Vdd2 gives firm A’s optimal wholesale price, Equation 14, if this wholesale
price satisfies firm B’s participation constraint. Substituting Equation 14 into Equations 31 and 32 gives stage III
equilibrium values.
Price-cost margins are
pddA ~
1
2
4{sð Þ 2zsð Þ
8zs2
ð33Þ
and
pIIIB {v~
1{sð Þ 2zs2 
8zs2
: ð34Þ
Expressions for quantities demanded are obtained from the first-order conditions. Equilibrium values are
VddA ~
1
r
1
4
z
1{s
1zsð Þ 8zs2ð Þ{kA
 	
: ð35Þ
and Equation 15.
Firm B’s participation constraint is satisfied for kBƒkB (see Eqn. 16). If Equation 14 does not satisfy firm B’s
participation constraint, firm A can set a lower wholesale price, Equation 17, that makes Vdd2B ~0. Firm A’s constrained
downstream duopoly value satisfies
VcddA ~V
ex
A z
1
r
1{s
1zsð Þ 8zs2ð Þ{
8zs2
4{s2ð Þ2
vdd{vcdd
 2" #
: ð36Þ
VcddA wVexA for vcdd near vdd . As kB rises and vcdd falls, a threshold value (Eqn. 21) is reached at which VcddA ~VexA , and
for larger kB, firm A prefers exclusion to constrained downstream duopoly.
Transfer Price Rule
The TPR requires that the pseudo-profit V^AD of firm A’s downstream unit, Equation 22 or Equation 23, be
nonnegative. Setting V^AD~0 for v~v
dd gives the threshold value k^A, (24). For kAwk^A the TPR is a binding constraint
if firm B’s participation constraint would be met without the TPR. Setting V^AD~0 for v~v
cdd gives the threshold value
~kA, Equation 25. For kAw~kA the TPR is a binding constraint if firm B’s participation constraint would not be met
without the TPR. If the TPR is a binding constraint and firm A opts for downstream duopoly, it sets v so V^AD~0. If set
equal to 0, Equation 23 is a quadratic equation in v and can be solved for vtpr, Equation 26.
All equilibrium characteristics of interest can be found from vtpr. In particular, firm A’s downstream duopoly
value under the TPR is
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V
tpr
A ~
1
r
2zs
4s2 1zsð Þ2 4zsð Þ2 4z2szs
2{ 2{sð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2zsð Þ2z4s 4zsð Þ 1zsð Þ
2
1{s
kA
s2
4
3
5
| { 4{2s{s2
 
z 2zsð Þ
ffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffiffi
2zsð Þ2z4s 4zsð Þ 1zsð Þ
2
1{s
kA
s2
4
3
5:
ð37Þ
Comparing V
tpr
A and V
ex
A gives
^^
kA, Equation 28, the threshold value above which firm A will opt for exclusion under the
TPR.
Comparing equilibrium values if the TPR is and is not in effect gives the comparative static changes the signs of
which are indicated in Table 2.
References
Baker, Jonathan. 2012. Exclusion as a core competition concern. Unpublished paper, Institute for Consumer Antitrust
Studies, Loyola University, Chicago.
Baumol, William J., and J. Gregory Sidak. 1994. The pricing of inputs sold to competitors. Yale Journal of Regulation
11:171–202.
Carlton, Dennis W. 2008. Should ‘price squeeze’ be a recognized form of anti-competitive conduct? Journal of
Competition Law and Economics 4:271–8..
Clark, John Bates. 1900a. The necessity of suppressing monopolies while retaining trusts. In Chicago conference on trusts.
Chicago: Civic Federation of Chicago, pp. 404–9.
Clark, John Bates. 1900b. Trusts. Political Science Quarterly 15:181–95.
Clark, John Bates. 1904. The real dangers of the trusts. Century Illustrated Magazine 68:954–9.
Clerckx, Serge, and Laurent De Muyter. 2009. Price squeeze abuse in the EU telecommunications sector: A reasonably
or equally efficient test. Global Competition Policy.
Gilbert, Richard J. 1989. The role of potential competition in industrial organization. Journal of Economic Perspectives
3(3):107–27.
Gordon, Sanford D. 1963. Attitudes towards trusts prior to the Sherman Act. Southern Economic Journal 30(2):156–67.
Granitz, Elizabeth, and Benjamin Klein. 1996. Monopolization by ‘raising rivals’ costs’: The Standard Oil case. Journal
of Law and Economics 39:1–47.
Grout, Paul A. 2003. Defining a price squeeze in competition law. In Swedish Competition Authority: The pros and cons
of low prices. Accessed 25 September 2012. Available http://www.konkurrensverket.se/upload/Filer/Trycksaker/
Rapporter/Pros&Cons/rap_pros_and_cons_low_prices.pdf). pp. 71–96.
Hart, Oliver, and Jean Tirole. 1980. Vertical integration and market foreclosure. Brookings Papers on Economic Activity:
Microeconomics, 1980:205–76.
Hausman, Jerry A., and Timothy J. Tardiff. 1995. Efficient local exchange competition. Antitrust Bulletin 40:529–56.
Hay, George A., and Kathryn McMahon. 2012. The diverging approach to price squeezes in the United States and
Europe. Cornell Law Faculty Working Paper 91.
Hovenkamp, Erik N., and Herbert Hovenkamp. 2009. The viability of antitrust price squeeze claims. Arizona Law
Review 51(2):273–303.
King, Stephen P., and Rodney Maddock. 2002. Imputation rules and a vertical price squeeze. Australian Business Law
Review 30:43–60.
Klebaner, Benjamin J. 1964. Potential competition and the American antitrust legislation of 1914. Business History
Review 38(2):163–85.
Martin, Stephen, and Jan Vandekerckhove. 2010. Market performance implications of the transfer price rule.
Department of Economics, Krannert School of Management, Purdue University, Working Paper 1238.
Motta, Massimo, Alexandre de Streel. 2006. Excessive pricing and price squeeze under EU law. In Claus-Dieter
Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu European competition law annual: 2003 What is an abuse of a dominant position?,
edited by Claus-Dieter Ehlermann and Isabela Atanasiu. Portland, OR: Hart Publishing, pp. 92–125.
Noll, Roger G. 1995. The role of antitrust in telecommunications. Antitrust Bulletin 40:501–28.
Polo, Michele. 2007. Price squeeze: Lessons from the Telecom Italia case. Journal of Competition Law and Economics
3:453–70.
Posner, Richard A. 2001. Antitrust law: An economic perspective. 2nd edition. Chicago: The University of Chicago Press.
Prouty, Charles A. 1900. Railway discriminations and industrial combinations. Annals of the American Academy of
Political and Social Science 15:41–50.
486 Stephen Martin and Jan Vandekerckhove
Raimondos-Møller, Pascalis, and Kimberley Scharf. 2002. Transfer pricing rules and competing governments. Oxford
Economic Papers 54(2):230–46.
Sidak, Gregory J. 2008. Abolishing the price squeeze as a theory of antitrust liability. Journal of Competition Law and
Economics 4:279–309.
Vickers, John. 2010. Competition and property rights. Economic Journal 120:37.
Watkins, Myron W. 1927. Industrial combinations and public policy. Boston: Houghton Mifflin Company.
The Transfer Price Rule 487
Reproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without
permission.
